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OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Plaintiff-Appellants Cycle Chem, Inc. and Clean Venture, Inc. (collectively, 
“Cycle Chem”) appeal an order of the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey denying their motion for reconsideration of the District Court’s prior order 
granting the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. Background 
Cycle Chem is in the business of generating, transporting and storing hazardous 
waste in the state of New Jersey, an industry highly regulated by the New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”).1
                                              
1 Cycle Chem initially sued Lisa P. Jackson, naming her as the Commissioner of the 
DEP.  Cycle Chem amended its complaint, and while Jackson’s name remains in the case 
caption on appeal, the amended complaint substituted former DEP Commissioner 
Bradley Campbell as the defendant in Jackson’s place. 
  On December 5, 2001 and 
December 31, 2001, the DEP attempted to inspect Cycle Chem’s facilities pursuant to the 
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New Jersey Solid Waste Management Act and associated regulations.  Cycle Chem failed 
to provide certain requested documents and to allow inspection of its oil drums at that 
time.   
The DEP imposed two penalties on Cycle Chem for failing to permit the 
inspections.  Cycle Chem contested those penalties in a state administrative proceeding 
before an administrative law judge.  The Commissioner of the DEP adopted the findings 
of the administrative law judge, upheld the imposition of the penalties, and fixed their 
total amount at $29,000.  Cycle Chem appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the 
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, which affirmed the 
Commissioner’s ruling.  The New Jersey Supreme Court then denied Cycle Chem’s 
petition for certification in November 2005.   
Two years later, Cycle Chem filed a § 1983 action in federal court, alleging due 
process and Fourth Amendment violations.  Cycle Chem claims that the Defendant, the 
Commissioner of the DEP, violated its due process rights by imposing the penalties 
without evidence that Cycle Chem refused to allow the DEP to inspect the premises, and 
that the decision of the administrative law judge and the Commissioner violated its due 
process rights by upholding the penalties despite no evidence sustaining their validity.  
Cycle Chem further claims that the administrative search regime authorizing the DEP to 
inspect its facilities violates the Fourth Amendment.   
The Commissioner moved to dismiss Cycle Chem’s case.  At oral argument, the 
District Court granted that motion on the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See 
generally Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).  The 
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District Court also denied Cycle Chem’s motion for leave to file a second amended 
complaint because that proposed complaint would also have been subject to dismissal 
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  The District Court memorialized its decision in an 
order filed on September 4, 2008.  That order provided that Cycle Chem “may, within 30 
days of the date of this Order, file a renewed motion for leave to file a Second Amended 
Complaint to assert claims for relief not based on the alleged wrongdoing underlying the 
claim asserted in the Amended Complaint.”  If Cycle Chem did not file the renewed 
motion, the order further provided that “the Amended Complaint will be dismissed with 
prejudice and the Clerk of the Court will be directed to close this case.”  (App. at A2.)   
On September 19, 2008, Cycle Chem filed a motion for reconsideration under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).  Under then-existing rules, that motion was 
untimely.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (2008) (requiring that a motion for reconsideration be 
filed no later than ten days after entry of the judgment).  In its motion, Cycle Chem 
argued that the District Court was wrong to dismiss the complaint on the basis of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  Cycle Chem also renewed its motion to file a second amended 
complaint, timely submitting that filing on October 3, 2008.  In an order filed on January 
6, 2009, the District Court denied Cycle Chem’s motion for reconsideration and renewed 
motion to file a second amended complaint.  The order also provided that “this action be 
and hereby is CLOSED.”  (App. at A13.)  Cycle Chem then filed a notice of appeal on 
February 2, 2009, which was timely when measured from the order denying the motion 
for reconsideration, but clearly untimely when measured from the order dismissing the 
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complaint.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) (setting a 30-day deadline to file a notice of 
appeal). 
 
II. Discussion 
 A threshold issue — whether the September 4, 2008 order dismissing Cycle 
Chem’s complaint was an appealable final order — must first be answered so that we 
may determine the scope of our jurisdiction in this appeal.  If the initial dismissal order 
was not an appealable final judgment, Cycle Chem’s notice of appeal from the order 
denying the motion for reconsideration would bring up the initial dismissal order for 
review.  That is, if the initial dismissal order was merely an interlocutory order, then the 
January 6, 2009 order would be the only final order in this case.  As such, we would then 
have jurisdiction over both the January 6, 2009 order and the initial dismissal order 
because under the merger rule, prior interlocutory orders, like the initial dismissal order 
here, “merge with the final judgment in a case, and the interlocutory orders (to the extent 
that they affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on appeal from the final order.”  
Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  If, however, the initial dismissal order was an appealable final 
order, we would need to address whether Cycle Chem’s notice of appeal brings up the 
initial dismissal order for review, i.e., whether Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) tolls the time 
for taking the appeal. 
We find that the initial dismissal order was not an appealable final order.  Rather, 
the order was essentially a dismissal without prejudice because it granted Cycle Chem the 
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opportunity to file a renewed motion to file a second amended complaint.  A dismissal 
without prejudice is generally not an appealable final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 
unless “the plaintiff cannot cure the defect in the complaint or elects to stand on the 
complaint without amendment.”  Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 F.3d 376, 381 (3d 
Cir. 1996).  Cycle Chem did not elect to stand on the complaint without amendment; 
instead, it renewed its motion to file a second amended complaint, which it believed 
alleged wrongdoing that did not form the basis of the complaint that the District Court 
dismissed.  Therefore, the initial dismissal order was not an appealable final order under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
Only the order denying Cycle Chem’s motion for reconsideration was an 
appealable final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; in that order, the District Court finally 
dismissed the case with prejudice by ordering that “this action be and hereby is 
CLOSED.”  (App. at A13.)  Cycle Chem’s notice of appeal was timely when measured 
from that order.  Because under the merger rule, the initial dismissal order is merged with 
the final judgment, we review on appeal both the District Court’s denial of the motion for 
reconsideration and the initial underlying dismissal.2
                                              
2 To the extent that the order denying the motion for reconsideration also denied Cycle 
Chem’s renewed motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, we do not review 
it on appeal.  Cycle Chem has waived any right to appeal that decision, for it has not 
presented any argument on that portion of the District Court’s order in its briefs.  See 
Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993). 
  We exercise plenary review over 
those decisions.  See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(exercising plenary review over a motion to dismiss); Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-
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Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999) (exercising plenary review when 
the denial of a motion for reconsideration is predicated on an issue of law). 
The District Court initially dismissed the case without prejudice and denied the 
motion for reconsideration for the same reason; it believed that pursuant to the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, it had no subject matter jurisdiction over Cycle Chem’s suit.  The 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine “takes its name from the only two cases in which the Supreme 
Court has applied it to defeat federal subject-matter jurisdiction:  Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 
Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).”  Great 
Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2010).  
As the Supreme Court has explained, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is confined to cases 
of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name:  cases brought by state-court 
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the 
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of 
those judgments.”  Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.  The doctrine, the Court has 
emphasized, applies in “limited circumstances” and is “not triggered simply by the entry 
of judgment in state court.”  Id. at 291, 292.    
There are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to 
apply:  “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complain[s] of injuries 
caused by [the] state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered before the 
federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject 
the state judgments.”  Great Western Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (internal quotation marks 
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and citation omitted).  “The second and fourth requirements are the key to determining 
whether a federal suit presents an independent, non-barred claim.”  Id.  Here, the District 
Court focused on the second requirement.  It reasoned that Cycle Chem’s injury — the 
penalties — was caused by the state-court judgments because even though the penalties 
were imposed by the DEP, they were upheld by the New Jersey Appellate Division.   
As we explained in our recent opinion in Great Western Mining, we can determine 
whether a plaintiff is complaining of injuries caused by a state-court judgment by 
identifying the source of the plaintiff’s injury.  If the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is to 
apply, the injury must be caused by the state-court judgment, not the defendant.  But 
“when the source of the injury is the defendant’s actions (and not the state court 
judgments), the federal suit” is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “even if it 
asks the federal court to deny a legal conclusion reached by the state court.”  Id. at 167.  
We further noted that “[a] useful guidepost is the timing of the injury, that is, whether the 
injury complained of in federal court existed prior to the state-court proceedings and thus 
could not have been ‘caused by’ those proceedings.”  Id.  (citations omitted). 
Cycle Chem’s injury, from the alleged due process and Fourth Amendment 
violations, stemmed not from the New Jersey Appellate Division’s decision to uphold the 
penalties.  Rather, the source of the injury is the DEP, for it is the DEP that engaged in 
allegedly illegal warrantless searches of Cycle Chem’s facilities and imposed penalties on 
Cycle Chem without due process for impeding its attempted search.  This injury occurred 
before any proceedings in state court began.  The Appellate Division’s decision merely 
affirmed the penalties; it was not the source of the claimed injury.  Therefore, the District 
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Court incorrectly held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred it from exercising 
jurisdiction over Cycle Chem’s suit. 
Nevertheless, as we observed in Great Western Mining, principles of preclusion 
may still bar a federal court from hearing the claims presented.  See 615 F.3d at 173 
(“Ordinarily, having concluded our jurisdictional inquiry, the next step would be to apply 
state law to determine the preclusive effect of the prior state-court judgments.”).  We find 
that res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies to Cycle Chem’s action.  As a result, the 
District Court was correct to dismiss Cycle Chem’s complaint and deny its motion for 
reconsideration. 
The doctrine of res judicata applies to federal civil actions brought under § 1983, 
and, in this context, we must afford “a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as 
would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was 
rendered.”  Jones v. Holvey, 29 F.3d 828, 829-30 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).  Res 
judicata bars the relitigation of “matters actually determined in an earlier action, [and] to 
all relevant matters that could have been so determined.”  Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel 
& Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592, 599 (N.J. 1991).  “If, under various theories, a litigant 
seeks to remedy a single wrong, then that litigant should present all theories in the first 
action. Otherwise, theories not raised will be precluded in a later action.”  Id.  Under New 
Jersey law, res judicata applies when “(1) the judgment in the first action is valid, final 
and on the merits; (2) there is identity of the parties, or the parties in the second action are 
in privity with those in the first action; and (3) the claim in the later action grows out of 
the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the first action.”  Jones, 29 F.3d at 830 
10 
 
(citing Watkins, 591 A.2d at 599; Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 559 A.2d 400, 405-06 
(N.J. 1989)).   
All three requirements are met here.  The judgment rendered by the New Jersey 
Appellate Division was valid, final and on the merits.  There is also identity of the 
parties, for Cycle Chem was a party to the first action and the Defendant, the DEP 
Commissioner, is the DEP’s privy.  See Jones, 29 F.3d at 830 (finding that the 
defendants, who were employees of a state agency, were in privity with that state agency, 
which was the defendant in the first action); see also Schuster v. Martin, 861 F.2d 1369, 
1373 (5th Cir. 1988) (“It is also a general principle of the law of preclusion that state 
officials are, as a matter of law, in privity with the agency or department in which they 
serve.”).   
Finally, the claims presented in this action grow out of the same transaction or 
occurrence as the claims in the first action; indeed, the New Jersey Appellate Division 
considered and rejected the same claims that Cycle Chem brings here.  Cycle Chem’s 
claims here stem from the DEP’s allegedly illegal search of Cycle Chem’s facilities and 
imposition of penalties on Cycle Chem for impeding the attempted search.  In its opinion, 
the Appellate Division listed Cycle Chem’s arguments, among them that the DEP “lacked 
authority to conduct a warrantless search” and that the penalties were wrongfully 
imposed.  (App. at A37.)  The Appellate Division then rejected those arguments, 
discerning “no basis in the record of this matter justifying a departure from the general 
rule permitting ‘administrative,’ i.e. warrantless, searches of highly or pervasively 
regulated industries” and finding that the penalties were therefore properly imposed.  (Id. 
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at A38-39.)  By doing so, the Appellate Division demonstrated that it would have 
exercised its original jurisdiction to resolve the § 1983 claims had Cycle Chem brought 
them in state court.  See Jones, 29 F.3d at 831-32 (predicting whether a state court would 
have exercised original jurisdiction over a § 1983 claim in an appeal from an 
administrative decision).  Accordingly, res judicata bars a federal court from entertaining 
Cycle Chem’s suit.  The District Court was correct to dismiss Cycle Chem’s complaint 
and deny its motion for reconsideration.   
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
